Evolution and Morality by James E. Fleming download in pdf, ePub, iPad
Just as with M, P and S, someone making this judgment will have reasons that she takes to justify this claim, ultimately tying into her overall conception of right and wrong. As with M, P and S, people typically have reasons for their moral judgments, and whether or not we agree with them, we typically take those reasons to explain why they believe what they do. And we are not justified in thinking that any such sheer coincidence has taken place. We might also employ autonomous, domain-general comprehensive moral reasoning to recognize that our instinctive feelings shouldn't always be followed, e. The following sub-section describes one leading hypothesis.
To take one dramatic example, consider social insect colonies, and in particular, the Hymenoptera bees, ants and wasps. They share blood by regurgitation, but do not share randomly. Should this fact undermine our confidence in the existence of moral truth or in the possibility of moral knowledge at least if moral truths are understood to be objective, i. In evolutionary terms, the best strategy to use for the prisoner's dilemma is tit-for-tat. But a trait that is not presently adaptive may once have been.
But the question is again how one is entitled to rely on moral intuitions e. Even if he's right that we have evolved dispositions against personal violence, that needn't be the whole explanation of why we object to Bridge while allowing for Trolley. Certain emotions and behaviors are then relevant too insofar as they relate to the exercise of such judgment, but in the absence of moral judgment they seem only to belong to proto-morality.
Arguments for or against such moves require difficult philosophical work. There is no such thing as absolute simultaneity.